Rescue Rocket: What Changes Did Putin Make to His Nuclear Doctrine and Why?

“The Line” for the West

Today's missile strike on Dnipro may clarify the extent to which our Western partners are prepared to stop Putin in his desire to escalate the conflict. So far, it seems that the West wants to “hide” from the issues surrounding the strike on Dnipro with an intercontinental ballistic missile designed to carry a nuclear warhead.

Judge for yourself, after the strike, Zelensky also stated that it was an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

“Today, a new Russian missile was launched. All characteristics – speed, altitude – are that of an intercontinental ballistic missile. Expert evaluations are ongoing. It is obvious that Putin is using Ukraine as a testing ground,” the president stated.

Moreover, experts believe it pertains to a new development – the RS-26 “Rubezh.” Nevertheless, Western media, which act as mouthpieces for the Western political establishment, have begun to “backtrack” significantly. They claim that this is not about an ICBM (effectively the first use of such weapons in history), but rather a conventional ballistic missile. However, judging by current events, such “leaks” resemble more of a “ostrich-like panic” from Western partners than a genuine desire to understand what Putin is currently orchestrating.

Putin publicly confirmed the use of Western-made missiles on Russian territory

He also stated that Russia struck Dnipro with a “ballistic missile with non-nuclear hypersonic capability,” according to Russian state media. According to the Russian president, it was a “Oreshnik” missile, and the strike was a “response to attacks by American and British weapons on Russia.”

Bunker Grandpa's Nuclear Doctrine

On Tuesday, November 19, Putin's decree “On Approving the Fundamentals of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence” was published. Essentially, this is an updated Russian nuclear doctrine. The Kremlin's approach to nuclear weapons remains unchanged: they are viewed as “a means of deterrence, the use of which is a last resort.” At the same time, the new doctrine provides for more scenarios in which the Kremlin threatens to use nuclear weapons. Kremlin spokesperson Peskov explained that the document needed updating due to the “current situation,” reminding that the U.S. had allowed Ukraine to strike deep into Russian territory with Western long-range weapons. “What is the most striking example of modern realities? U.S. authorities decide to use their weapons, American-made weapons, against the Russian Federation. This is a striking example of the new situation around our country, and it necessitates updating the concept,” he noted. Peskov also described Putin’s signing of the updated nuclear doctrine – “an extremely important document” – as very timely. Nuclear deterrence, according to him, is aimed at “ensuring that a potential adversary understands the inevitability of retaliation in case of aggression against the Russian Federation and/or its allies.”

In general, it was known how the doctrine of the aggressor state would change: back in late September, Putin held a special meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, in the open part of which he detailed upcoming innovations. It should be noted that several important provisions remained virtually unchanged compared to Putin’s “nuclear” decree from 2020. Thus, the new document states that Russia “considers nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence, the use of which is a last resort, and makes all necessary efforts to reduce the nuclear threat and prevent the escalation of interstate relations that could provoke military conflicts, including nuclear ones.” In 2020, nuclear weapons were viewed by Russian authorities “exclusively as a means of deterrence.” In the new doctrine, the word “exclusively” is absent. Otherwise, the approach has not changed. As in 2020, “guaranteed deterrence of a potential adversary from aggression against Russia and/or its allies” is among “the highest state priorities.” It must be ensured “by the entire aggregate of Russia's military power, including nuclear weapons.” Both the old and new documents state that “state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence is defensive in nature.”

Meanwhile, several provisions of the new Putin doctrine reflect what Peskov referred to as the “current situation.” It states that Russia “carries out nuclear deterrence against a potential adversary, understood as individual states and military coalitions (blocks, alliances)” that view Russia “as a potential adversary and possess nuclear and/or other types of weapons of mass destruction or significant combat potential of general-purpose forces.” However, the new doctrine further clarifies that nuclear deterrence “is also carried out against states that provide controlled territory, air and/or maritime space, and resources for the preparation and execution of aggression against the Russian Federation.” Specific blocs or countries are not listed in the decree of the wanted International Criminal Court (ICC) criminal, but it is clear that it refers to our country and NATO.

In accordance with “the emerging international situation, the number of primary military dangers” identified by the Kremlin has expanded. Thus, if there were six in the 2020 doctrine, there are now ten. In particular, it includes: the creation of new or expansion of existing military coalitions (blocks, alliances), leading to the approach of their military infrastructure to the borders of the Russian Federation; actions by a potential adversary aimed at isolating part of the territory of the Russian Federation, including blocking access to vital transport communications; actions by a potential adversary aimed at damaging (destroying) environmentally hazardous facilities in the Russian Federation that could lead to technological, environmental, or social disasters; planning and conducting large-scale military exercises by a potential adversary near the borders of the Russian Federation.

The most significant changes have been made to the section on the conditions for Russia's transition to the use of nuclear weapons. In the 2020 doctrine, there were four such scenarios; now there are five. Two points remain unchanged. Thus, the aggressor country still reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of “reliable information about the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territories of the Russian Federation and/or its allies,” as well as in the case of “adversary actions against critically important state or military facilities of the Russian Federation, the incapacitation of which would disrupt the retaliatory actions of the nuclear forces.”

Another scenario from Moscow is a “novelty.” According to it, Russia may use nuclear weapons in the event of “reliable information about a massive launch (takeoff) of aerospace attack means (strategic and tactical aircraft, cruise missiles, drones, hypersonic and other flying vehicles) and their crossing of the state border of the Russian Federation.” Finally, another scenario has been supplemented with an important formulation. Thus, the 2020 doctrine stated that Russian authorities could employ nuclear weapons in response to “the adversary's use of nuclear or other types of weapons of mass destruction against the territories of the Russian Federation and/or its allies.” Now, after these words, it is stated that this also applies to “military formations and/or facilities of the Russian Federation located beyond its territory.” In other words, the Russian nuclear umbrella now covers military bases of the Russian Federation located abroad.

In addition to all the above, important changes have been made to the scenario under which Russian authorities in 2020 reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of “aggression against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is at stake.” Now, the Russians are ready to employ nuclear weapons in the event of “aggression against the Russian Federation and/or the Republic of Belarus as participants of the Union State using conventional weapons, creating a critical threat to their sovereignty and/or territorial integrity.” Thus, as we can see, official Minsk is granted special guarantees of protection, and the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, at least at the declarative level, is somewhat lowered, since it is no longer about the threat to the existence of both states but rather about a critical violation of their sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Putin hopes that the West will carefully study the updated nuclear doctrine of Russia, recently stated the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry Sergey Lavrov. Identical hopes were expressed by the well-known deputy head of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev. At the same time, the former decorative president of Russia published a post on his Telegram channel about the connection between the decision to strike with Western missiles deep into Russia and the new nuclear doctrine: “The use of NATO missiles in this manner can now be qualified as an attack by the bloc's countries on Russia. In this case, there arises the right to deliver a retaliatory strike with weapons of mass destruction against Kyiv and the main NATO facilities, wherever they may be. And this is already WWIII (World War III - ed.).”

“It is absolutely clear that Putin's signing of the nuclear doctrine decree just after Ukraine finally received permission to strike sovereign territory of the Russian Federation is yet another significant moment for nuclear blackmail of Western countries by the RF. The West will now be pondering whether it is nuclear propaganda blackmail from the RF or a real decision by the Russian president to use nuclear weapons at some point, and whether Putin is looking for grounds for such use. But against whom? Against Ukraine or against the nuclear state that allowed Ukraine to shell its sovereign territory with domestically produced missiles? In other words, is Putin really ready for a real conflict with NATO member countries? There are no realistic answers to all these questions, but it is quite clear that the nuclear blackmail institutionalized by Putin is not accidental at this moment. It will