In discussing the first year of Ukraine's independence, which has unfolded amidst the brutal and cynical full-scale war unleashed by Putin's Russia, Lenta.UA spoke with Doctor of Philosophy, Director of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Yevhen Holovakha. We conducted a detailed analysis of the highs and lows of our state in 2023 with the well-known political scientist and head of the sociological service "Ukrainian Barometer," Viktor Nebozhenko. Meanwhile, we are communicating with the leading analyst of the National Institute for Strategic Studies, Ivan Us.
– A significant stir was created by Dmitry Gordon's "forecast" regarding the end of the so-called hot phase of the war on December 30, 2024. What do you think caused such an emotionally charged reaction from society?
– It’s worth noting that the reaction extended far beyond social media – even Putin's spokesperson Peskov was compelled to comment, or rather, to refute the rumors initiated by Gordon. As for society's reaction, it can be explained first by a corresponding demand for peace, and second, the New Year period encourages people to believe in miracles. Additionally, there is an expectation of a new era – the era of Trump, who also promised to quickly end the war. Therefore, unfortunately, critical thinking is not prevalent among all. You know, there was a story back in 2009 during the “swine flu” when the deputy director of the Institute of International Security, Hutsal, said: “I’m a Doctor of Economic Sciences, and I bought myself two bags of buckwheat because everyone around was saying there would be a crisis and it’s necessary to stock up. And I, knowing that there would be no crisis, bought two rotten bags…” Thus, as we see, even experienced professionals with an understanding of processes sometimes commit, let’s say, strange acts. The only justification for those who expected something from Gordon's "forecast," in my opinion, is the understanding that there will be an unexpected ending. Hence, people thought: why should this happen sometime, and not now?
– If we focus on pragmatic forecasts, what picture do you see?
- When I analyze the Russian economy, I understand that despite the authorities there constantly "puffing up their cheeks," the actual resilience is not very high. Just recently, the ruble collapsed again. When it surged to 114, they managed to bring it back down and claimed they had withstood the blow. But a month passed, and today we see the rate at 108 again. This indicates that there are problems in the Russian economy, which will take on a very deep character in the second half of 2025. While Ukraine has financial backing from the USA, Japan, the UK, the EU, the World Bank, the IMF, etc., Russia has no such entities. In Russia, there’s North Korea, which will provide military support but not funds, Iran, which supplies drones but no resources, and the only country that could provide money is China. However, China has its own vision, based on the fact that trade turnover with Russia accounts for 4%, while the share with the USA and EU is 24%. So, it is more beneficial for China to align with the European Union and the United States. Additionally, China needs investments and technology, which Russia cannot provide for either. Interestingly, the Central Bank of Russia stated in its research six months ago that it does not rule out the possibility of zeroing out Russia's National Wealth Fund by 2025. That’s what we wish for them.
– If we set aside the factor of potential economic exhaustion of Russia, do you think there are chances for peacekeeping initiatives, such as those from Trump?
- It's hard to say because, in my opinion, this war will end for economic reasons. Why? Because if we talk about military options, there are two scenarios: either Russia reaches Kyiv and captures all of Ukraine, or Ukraine reaches Moscow and captures significant territories. I don’t believe in either of these outcomes. At the same time, the belief that a military solution might exist is supported by new and ongoing packages of assistance to Ukraine from allies. Furthermore, there are hopes for reserves that have not been consistently utilized and may now emerge to replicate what happened in Kharkiv in 2022, when one well-calculated strike yielded significant results. It’s unlikely that such a feat can be exactly replicated, but there is faith, although I wouldn’t give more than 3% realism to the military option.
- Joe Biden essentially announced just before the New Year on Monday, December 30, that the USA would provide security assistance packages to Ukraine amounting to nearly $2.5 billion. Why do you think Washington has been providing support in such small increments throughout the years of full-scale war, constantly repeating the mantra about escalation?
- Biden wants to do something substantial so that later, no one can say he didn’t do enough for Ukraine’s victory. Additionally, (and I do not rule out such a scenario), under Trump, assistance might be greater, and Biden fears criticism for seemingly doing nothing. Thus, Biden needs to make up for lost time and allocate assistance to Ukraine before January 20 – the day of Trump’s inauguration, because, as they said in a famous Soviet film: “The last phrase will be remembered.” So here too: it will be remembered that Biden, as a farewell, did a lot for Ukraine, while the question of why he didn’t do this in previous years will be forgotten.
- President Zelensky stated that no country or leader in the world has the right to negotiate with Russia on behalf of Ukraine, emphasizing that any dialogue with the Kremlin can only occur with a plan agreed upon with Kyiv. Which allied state might play a significant role in 2025?
– In 2025, I expect a more active position from the two most populous countries – China and India. Currently, many are focusing on the agreement between India and Russia regarding oil supplies for the upcoming year. However, I question whether Russia can genuinely ensure the practical implementation of this agreement. We’re talking about half a million barrels a day via tankers, not all of which, to put it mildly, meet technical capabilities. Here, I believe there’s a foundation for potential claims against Russia from India regarding penalties for contract non-fulfillment. Therefore, I anticipate that India may also adopt a more open and decisive stance regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war. Additionally, I think Japan – one of the largest economies in the world – could see an increase in its role. For official Tokyo, a Russian defeat in the war against Ukraine means the return of its territories, meaning Japan has a direct and immediate interest in Moscow’s failure. Unfortunately, South Korea, which could also play a significant role, has taken a back seat. However, if in 2025 there is stabilization of the political situation there and North Korea continues to pose a threat to Seoul, South Korea may still have a significant say in the Russian-Ukrainian war. I believe that the Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, will play an important role. The change in Assad's regime at the end of 2024 opens up opportunities for Qatar to build a gas pipeline to the EU through Turkey and Syria. Here, Russia’s relations with Gulf countries will be seriously complicated, which will have positive implications for us. As for China, it should be understood that Russia is primarily needed by China as a irritant for the USA, so I don’t think Beijing will significantly change its position. However, the tone of Trump’s administration’s conversations with Russia will be crucial. If China senses that Trump wants, so to speak, to trade Ukraine for an anti-China stance from Russia, Beijing's reaction will be immediate, as it will not allow that under any circumstances.
- How do you envision the development of the Ukraine-NATO track in 2025?
– Well, it’s clear that Ukraine will not become a NATO member in 2025. Overall, I personally believe that as soon as the war ends, despite all the issues with corruption and so forth, Ukraine will likely find itself in the North Atlantic Alliance because NATO will need a state with real combat experience. However, while the war is ongoing, discussions about NATO membership are off the table. Likewise, the presence of American troops in Ukraine is not on the table. As for European troops, I think they are more likely to be present than not. If Biden blocked this issue in every possible way to maintain Euro-Atlantic unity, Trump says the following: “Ukraine is fundamentally a European issue because if they want it, let them do it. We will provide the weapons, but not the people.” In such a situation, Macron, for example, could genuinely organize an operation under a conditional name like “Saving All of Europe from the Russian Army.” Americans will definitely not be there at the initial stage, and later, if Europeans achieve certain successes in Ukraine, it’s quite possible they might, because the USA is unlikely to want to give all the glory to Europeans. By the way, Trump’s merit is that he chose a good model, which involves appointing a special person (retired General Keith Kellogg) to handle matters related to the Russian-Ukrainian war. There are already rumors that Kellogg will arrive in Kyiv on the day of the inauguration, January 20, and immediately get to work.
Romashova Natalia